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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
Brian JM Quinn is an Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law 
School. Professor Quinn teaches Corporations and is the author of casebooks on 
corporate law and mergers and acquisitions. His research focuses on corporate law, 
mergers and acquisitions, the structuring of transactions, transactional law, and 
private ordering. Natali De Corso and Rebecca Rabinowitz are third-year law 
students at Boston College Law School, enrolled in its Amicus Brief Clinic. The 
Clinic is an experiential learning course designed to encourage faculty and 
students, as friends of the court, to submit amicus briefs that may assist courts in 
resolving important legal issues of the day.  
 Amici have academic and professional interest in the subject of corporate 
law. The views expressed are their own, and amici represent no institution, group 
or association. They submit this brief in response to the Court’s solicitation of 
amicus briefs in this case. See Docket No. SJC-12759, June 26, 2019.      
  
 
 
3 
 
DECLARATION OF AMICI INDEPENDENCE 
Amici are independent from the parties, have no economic interest in the 
outcome of this case, and declare that none of the conduct described in Appellate 
Rule 17 has occurred. Specifically: 
1. No party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; 
2. No party or party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to 
fund preparing or submitting this brief; 
3. No person or entity—other than the amicus curiae or their counsel—
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief; and 
4. None of the amici or their counsel represents or has represented one of 
the parties to the present appeal in another proceeding involving similar issues, or 
was a party or represented a party in a proceeding or legal transaction that is at 
issue in the present appeal. 
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ISSUES ADDRESSED BY AMICI 
Amici neither support a party nor recommend a specific disposition. The 
amici address the implications of applying equitable remedies (piercing the 
corporate veil and successor liability) against individuals who practice their 
professions as sole proprietors after dissolving a Chapter 156A professional 
corporation, of which they were the sole shareholder. Amici also address whether 
Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:06, warrants a different outcome as to successor 
liability than Chapter 156A would otherwise dictate. Amici do not address issue 
preclusion.  
STATEMENT OF FACTS  
Amici adopt the facts recited in the opinion below, supplemented by certain 
undisputed facts found by Judge Stearns and the First Circuit. Attorney Kelley was 
not personally liable to Mr. Smith; Attorney Bertucci, a former employee of R-
Kelley, P.C., was personally liable to Mr. Smith for fraud and G. L. c. 93A 
violations; and the PC was liable on a respondeat superior theory for Attorney 
Bertucci’s actions in the scope of his employment. A90-93. Mr. Smith was never a 
client of Attorney Bertucci, the PC, or Attorney Kelley individually. A92, fn12.     
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I.  Massachusetts adheres to the general principle of limited liability and 
acknowledges that it applies with equal force to professional corporations. 
Massachusetts courts, however, also recognize that equitable considerations 
sometimes permit a court to disregard the corporate liability shield and assign 
corporate liabilities to a shareholder. (12-27).  
IA.  The equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is available to 
courts to assign corporate liabilities to shareholders who disregard the corporate 
form. Where the sole shareholder of a professional corporation disregards the 
corporate entity and fails to interact with it on an arms-length basis, courts should 
not rescue the shareholder from personal liability when he seeks to raise the 
corporate veil against creditors. (13-17).  
IB.  In addition, the equitable doctrine of successor liability is available to 
courts where the successor corporation is no more than a mere continuation of the 
predecessor corporation. These doctrines apply to professional corporations and 
general corporations alike. With respect to successor liability and the professional 
corporation, where the successor is a limited liability entity, traditional successor 
liability remedies remain available to courts. (17-23). 
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IC.  If the successor is a sole proprietorship, however, the Court must 
address a novel question of first impression. No bright line test seems workable. 
Consequently, the choice before the Court requires it to carefully balance 
competing interests of justice and fairness. (23-27). 
II.  Under certain circumstances, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court’s rules assign corporate liabilities to shareholders of a professional 
corporation organized to engage in the practice of law. The existing Rule 3:06 is 
not applicable to this case, but the Court has general powers to regulate the practice 
of law more stringently than Chapter 156A requires. (27-31)
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ARGUMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
Theories of successor liability and piercing the corporate veil are not 
substantive legal doctrines but rather shorthand descriptions of equitable remedies 
adopted by courts in the interests of fairness and justice. These interests include 
striking a balance between the limitation on shareholders’ individual liability – 
essential to the modern corporate form – and curtailing incentives for controllers of 
corporations to use the corporation as a weapon against innocent creditors. 
Applying principles of Equity, courts analyze a transaction according to its real 
nature, looking through its form to its substance and intent. Milliken & Co. v. Duro 
Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 560 (2008). Piercing the corporate veil in the 
context of sole-shareholder professional corporations is noncontroversial. A 
professional corporation is not a license to engage in fraud. Where a sole-
shareholder has abused the corporate form, courts should not bow to form and 
provide comfort.  
As to successor liability, however, this Court’s precedents to date have 
involved only successor business corporations. As the trial judge noted, it appears 
to be an issue of first impression whether these corporate precedents apply in the 
same manner or force where the purported successor is not a limited liability 
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entity, but a sole proprietor conducting a personal services business in which he is 
licensed to engage. A367-68. 
Argument I addresses general principles drawn from the Court’s precedents 
and discusses whether the nature of professional corporations and the specific 
provisions of G.L. 156A dictate a different result from that which would occur in a 
case involving a general business corporation. Argument II addresses whether 
Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:06, which governs lawyers practicing under a 
professional corporation, warrants a different outcome than Chapter 156A would 
otherwise dictate.  
I. Shareholders of Chapter 156A Professional Corporations  
Enjoy the Same Limitations of Liability as Shareholders  
of Chapter 156D Corporations and Should Likewise  
Be Subject to the Same Exceptions to Limited Liability  
 
Under Massachusetts law, shareholders of professional corporations enjoy 
the same degree of limited liability afforded to shareholders of corporations formed 
under c.156D. See G. L. c. 156A, § 6(a) (“[T]he personal liability of a shareholder 
of a professional corporation . . . [is] no greater in any respect than that of a 
shareholder of a corporation organized under chapter 156d.”). Consequently, 
shareholders of professional corporations are generally not “personally liable for 
the acts or debts of the corporation . . . .” See G. L. c. 156D, § 6.22(b). Consistent 
with common law doctrines of agency, however, when corporate liabilities arise 
from the shareholder’s own acts or conduct, the shareholder remains personally 
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liable for the resulting damages. See G. L. c. 156D, § 6.22(b). In addition, this 
Court has long held that if shareholders disregard or abuse the privileges of the 
corporate form, the statutory protection of limited liability may be lost.  
A. Piercing the Corporate Veil Allows Courts to  
Assign Liability for Corporate Debts to Shareholders 
 
Although Massachusetts has recognized a shareholder’s limited liability as a 
“general principle of corporate law,” the equitable doctrine of corporate disregard 
allows courts to look beyond the corporate form and assign liability for corporate 
debts to a shareholder. See Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill, 464 Mass. 145, 148 
(2013); My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 619 
(1968). The doctrine applies in “rare, particular situations”: (1) where the 
shareholder exercises “some form of pervasive control” in the activities of the 
corporation and there is “some fraudulent or injurious consequence”; or (2) where 
there is “a confused intermingling of activity of two or more corporations engaged 
in a common enterprise with substantial disregard of the separate nature of the 
corporate entities, or serious ambiguity about the manner and capacity in which the 
various corporations and their respective representations are acting.” See 
Cumberland Farms, 353 Mass. at 619.  
Use of the corporate form to perpetuate a fraud is a significant factor in the 
decision whether to pierce the corporate veil. The demonstration of fraud in a veil-
piercing claim requires “less than a showing of fraudulent intent, which is not 
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required for piercing under Massachusetts law.” George Hyman Constr. Co. v. 
Gateman, 16 F. Supp. 2d 129, 156 (D. Mass. 1998). Evidence demonstrating that a 
corporation “was established or operated so as to misrepresent or divert assets” 
suggests that the corporation was “engaged in promoting fraud.” See Evans v. 
Multicon Constr. Corp., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 736 (1991). A “circumstance 
strongly suggesting veil piercing is a case of ‘financial misconduct of the 
subsidiary involving such manipulation as asset-stripping or asset-siphoning, 
which depletes the resources of the subsidiary.’” Gateman, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 155 
(quotation omitted); see also Crane v. Green & Freedman Baking Co., 134 F.3d 17, 
23 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[T]he wrongful diversion of corporate assets to or for 
controlling individuals at a time when the corporation is in financial distress [i]s a 
fraud that can justify piercing the corporate veil.”). 
When such circumstances arise, “the corporate veil can be pierced, as a tool 
of equity, to disregard the corporation's existence and impose liability on 
individual principals.” Kraft, 464 Mass. at 148. Because either of the two 
categories permits piercing the corporate veil, a claim based on “confused 
intermingling” does not require a showing of a “fraudulent or injurious 
consequence.” Commonwealth v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 
22, 37-38 (2011). 
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In deciding whether to apply the piercing doctrine, courts evaluate twelve 
factors:  
(1) common ownership; (2) pervasive control; (3) confused intermingling of 
business assets; (4) thin capitalization; (5) nonobservance of corporate 
formalities; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) no payment of dividends; (8) 
insolvency at the time of the litigated transaction; (9) siphoning away of 
corporation's funds by dominant shareholders; (10) nonfunctioning of officers 
and directors; (11) use of the corporation for transactions of the dominant 
shareholders; and (12) use of the corporation in promoting fraud. 
AG v. M.C.K., Inc., 432 Mass. 546, 555 n.19 (2000); see also Pepsi-Cola 
Metropolitan Bottling Co. v. Checkers, Inc., 754 F.2d 10, 14-16 (1st Cir. 1985). 
While courts must consider each of the twelve factors, “the exercise is . . . not one 
in counting.” See Evans, 30 Mass. App. Ct. at 736. Rather, courts will examine 
“the twelve factors to form an opinion whether the over-all structure and operation 
misleads.” Id.   
A sole-shareholder professional corporation is not a license to defraud 
creditors. The fact that an individual is a sole shareholder of a corporation should 
not preclude the assignment of corporate liabilities to that shareholder via veil 
piercing. See Talaria Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., 827 F. Supp. 843, 
847 (D. Mass. 1993) (applying veil-piercing and finding that the corporate form, 
because it was a sham, did not shelter the sole shareholder and officer from the 
corporate debts); Debreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc., Civil Action No 85-3386-
MA, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1270, at *12-13 (D. Mass. Jan. 23, 1987) (“[A]n 
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individual may be held personally liable for a corporation's withdrawal payments if 
the circumstances require piercing the corporate veil under traditional common law 
principles.”). 
Sole shareholders of professional corporations are highly susceptible to veil 
piercing because shareholders in such corporations can easily run afoul of the 
piercing factors. To the extent sole-shareholder professional corporations are 
informally managed, without shareholder or board meetings or attention to other 
corporate formalities, such corporations make themselves vulnerable to veil-
piercing claims. Where the sole shareholder of a professional corporation 
disregards the corporate entity and corporate separateness in the daily management 
of the entity, it is as if the shareholder is engaging in the practice of the profession 
in his own name and not in the name of the professional corporation.  
Of course, informality alone is not necessarily sufficient to sustain a veil-
piercing claim. However, informality combined with other factors identified by the 
Court may suffice. See M.C.K., Inc., 432 Mass. at 555 n.19. Where sufficient 
indicia of a shareholder’s disregard for the corporate form are present, it would be 
inequitable to permit the shareholder to benefit from a corporation’s limited 
liability shield. 
That the entity in question is a sole-shareholder professional corporation 
should not raise a significant issue with respect to the Court’s analysis in the 
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present case. Whether a professional corporation has one or just a small number of 
shareholders is not an invitation for the shareholders to disregard the corporate 
form in their dealings with the entity. Accordingly, when the sole shareholder of a 
professional corporation fails to treat the corporation with due regard, piercing the 
corporate veil is an appropriate remedy notwithstanding the fact that the entity is a 
sole-shareholder professional corporation. See id; see also Pepsi-Cola, 754 F.2d at 
16 (“Where the principal shareholders of a close corporation fail to observe with 
care the corporation's existence, a court will not later heed their requests to do 
so.”).  
Amici express no view about whether application of these well-established 
principles to the detailed facts of this case warrants piercing the corporate veil.  
B. Successor Liability Permits Imposing Liability  
for a Seller Corporation’s Debts Upon A Buyer  
of Its Assets in Certain Circumstances 
 
Massachusetts adheres to the general tenet of corporate law that the 
liabilities of a seller-predecessor do not attach to a buyer-successor when 
purchasing the seller’s assets. See McCarthy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 410 Mass. 15, 
21 (1991). However, for policy reasons akin to those of veil piercing, the Court 
developed the remedy of successor liability to address abuse of the privileges of 
the corporate form in the structuring of corporate transactions. In such cases, a 
court may impose liability on a successor corporation.  
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The doctrine seeks to balance two goals: “provid[ing] a necessary remedy to 
injured parties . . . and [offering] transactional clarity and certainty for business 
parties engaged in fundamental corporate transactions.” Matheson, Successor 
Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371, 372-373; see also Milliken, 451 Mass. at 556 
(noting that the doctrine of successor liability seeks to protect innocent creditors). 
Because successor liability is a doctrine rooted in equity, courts will inquire into 
the substance of a transaction rather than its form. See Milliken, 451 Mass. at 560. 
Additionally, courts assess liability with an eye towards fairness. See Demoulas v. 
Demoulas, 428 Mass. 555, 580 (1998) (“Equitable remedies are flexible tools to be 
applied with the focus on fairness and justice”). Ultimately, courts may impose 
liability when, in the exercise of their sound discretion, it is “fair under the 
circumstances and in light of the underlying policies.” See Matheson, supra at 406. 
Courts may impose liability on corporate successors in any of the following 
four generally recognized circumstances: (1) the buyer impliedly or expressly 
assumed the seller’s liabilities; (2) the transaction constituted a de facto merger; (3) 
the buyer is a mere continuation of the seller; or (4) the transaction was a 
fraudulent attempt to avoid the seller’s liabilities. Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox 
Co. (Pexto), 739 F.2d 690, 692 (1st Cir. 1984). The plaintiff bears the burden of 
demonstrating the existence of an exception.   
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1. Implied or Express Assumption 
A buyer-successor may be liable for the obligations of a seller-predecessor 
when the buyer impliedly or explicitly assumes those liabilities. DeJesus v. 
Bertsch, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 353, 364 (D. Mass. 2012). In DeJesus, the court 
concluded that under the terms of a transaction agreement, the buyer of a 
significant portion of the seller’s assets agreed to assume only those liabilities 
expressly provided for under the agreement. Id. at 365. Consequently, successor 
liability did not extend to tort liabilities, which were not covered under the 
transaction agreement. See id. 
There is no suggestion in the case before this Court that Attorney Kelley 
impliedly or explicitly assumed the PC’s liability for the judgment obtained by Mr. 
Smith when he voluntarily dissolved the PC and transferred its assets to his sole 
proprietorship. Indeed, there is evidence that Attorney Kelley specifically intended 
to leave behind the judgment in controversy. A236. 
2. De Facto Merger      
The de facto merger theory of successor liability applies when “the 
ownership, assets and management of one corporation are combined with those of 
another, preexisting entity.” Nat’l Gypsum Co. v. Cont. Brands Corp., 895 F. Supp. 
328, 336 (D. Mass. 1995). In determining whether a transfer is a de facto merger, 
courts generally consider:  
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whether (1) there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation 
so that there is continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, 
and general business operations; whether (2) there is a continuity of 
shareholders which results from the purchasing corporation paying for the 
acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock ultimately coming to 
be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that they become a 
constituent part of the purchasing corporation; whether (3) the seller 
corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves 
as soon as legally and practically possible; and whether (4) the purchasing 
corporation assumes those obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for 
the uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations of the seller 
corporation.  
 
Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 424 Mass. 356, 360 (1997). No single 
element is necessary or sufficient. Id.  
In Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., a home heating oil retailer sold 
substantially all of its assets to a corporation that continued the retailer’s business. 
Id. at 357. At the time of the sale, the retailer had outstanding obligations to 
another party. Id. The Court concluded that, under the de facto merger theory, the 
buyer was liable for the retailer’s obligations. Id. at 360-362 (pointing to the 
buyer’s continuation of the retailer’s operations, some overlap in shareholders, the 
retailer’s ceasing of operations under the transaction agreement, and the buyer’s 
assumption of the retailer’s liabilities that were critical to ensuring uninterrupted 
business operations). 
3. Mere Continuation 
The mere continuation line of successor liability cases imposes liability 
when there is “a reorganization transforming a single company from one corporate 
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entity into another.” McCarthy, 410 Mass. at 21-22; see Matheson, supra at 392. 
Thus, when a buyer-successor is simply the seller-predecessor wearing a “new 
hat,” courts will deem the buyer-successor a “mere continuation” and, 
notwithstanding an explicit agreement to the contrary, the seller’s liabilities will 
follow to the buyer. Bud Antle, Inc. v. E. Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th 
Cir. 1985). Liability is justified because the buyer-successor “in substance if not in 
form” is the same company as the predecessor. McCarthy, 410 Mass. at 22. Several 
traditional factors point to a mere continuation: “continuity of directors, officers, 
and stockholders; and the continued existence of only one corporation after the sale 
of assets.” Id. at 23. No one factor is dispositive and each set of facts much be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. Milliken, 451 Mass. at 558. 
In McCarthy v. Litton Industries, Inc., a lathe-manufacturing business 
transferred its assets to its only shareholder’s sole proprietorship, which later 
incorporated. 410 Mass. at 17-18. After the transfer, the shareholder sold his shares 
in the company to a Delaware corporation. Id. at 18. The Court concluded that the 
buyer of the lathe-manufacturing business was not liable under a continuation 
theory of successor liability because the seller of those assets continued to exist 
after the transaction. Id. at 22. 
  In Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, on the other hand, the Court 
considered whether the foreclosure sale of nearly the entirety of a borrower’s 
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assets generated successor liability for the purchaser. See 451 Mass. at 558-559 
(analyzing the successor liability of “New Duro” as a result of its purchase of 
nearly all of the assets of “Old Duro”). Following the underlying transaction, Old 
Duro ceased its regular business operations in the textile industry, but did not 
formally dissolve. Id. at 559. Instead, operating under a new name, it leased its 
property to New Duro, which continued Old Duro’s work in the textile industry. 
Id. New Duro argued that successor liability was inapposite since Old Duro was 
not dissolved and continued in existence. Id. at 558. The Court rejected this “form 
over substance” argument, however, concluding that Old Duro’s continued 
existence did not “trump[] the existence of New Duro as the successor corporation 
on whom liability properly should be imposed.” See id. at 559 (noting that Old 
Duro’s sale of its business operations to New Duro enabled the latter to continue 
without interruption of the former’s manufacturing operations).  
4. Fraud  
Finally, under the fraud line of successor liability cases, a buyer of 
fraudulently transferred assets (i.e., transferred by a seller for less than fair value 
merely to escape a liability) is responsible for the assets’ liabilities. Dayton, 739 
F.2d at 692. For purposes of this brief, amici proceed on the assumption that the 
$85,000 paid by Attorney Kelley to the bankruptcy trustee was fair value for those 
assets, and put aside any further fraudulent conveyance analysis. If the transfer and 
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use of the PC’s assets was for less than fair value, presumably Attorney Kelley 
would be (or was) liable to the bankrupt estate. Amici do not address whether 
liability to Mr. Smith exists on a fraudulent transfer theory for the value of those 
assets. 
C. Successor Liability and the Professional Corporation 
Like its sister remedy of veil-piercing, successor liability should be generally 
available for application against professional corporations that leave behind 
unsatisfied liabilities.  
1.  Corporate Successor 
Where the successor entity is another professional corporation or other 
limited liability entity, the application of successor liability doctrines to 
professional corporations should be relatively noncontroversial. In Groman v. 
Watman, a professional corporation was liable for the debts of a prior professional 
corporation under a mere continuation theory of successor liability. 27 Mass. L. 
Rep. 359, 362 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2010). In Groman, Children’s Dental 
(“Children’s”), in which Watman was the sole officer and director, filed for 
bankruptcy after Groman obtained a judgment against Watman for falling behind 
on monthly payments. Id. at 359-360. Watman then left Children’s and began to 
practice dentistry under Lowell Dentistry (“Lowell”), which later incorporated as a 
professional corporation with Watman as the sole officer, director and shareholder. 
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Id. at 360. The court found that Lowell was a mere continuation of Children’s – 
and thus liable for Children’s debts under successor liability. Id. at 362. In effect, 
Lowell was a “reincarnat[ion]” of Children’s “in all its essential attributes.” Id. 
Groman is consistent with this Court’s precedents and should be applied in these 
cases. 
2.  Individual Successor 
In the case before the Court, Attorney Kelley acted as the sole shareholder to 
voluntarily dissolve Kelley-PC. He then transferred various business liabilities of 
the dissolved PC (e.g., phone, lease, etc.), as well as the PC’s customers, some 
receivables, and other assets, to himself as a sole proprietor. He declined, however, 
to assume the PC’s single, largest liability: the judgment in controversy. Arguably, 
Attorney Kelley’s sole proprietorship is a mere continuation of the defunct PC. 
This case presents the Court with what appears to be a hard choice. On the 
one hand, a bright-line rule that the successor liability remedy is not available 
where a sole shareholder of a professional corporation voluntarily dissolves the 
corporation and then practices as a sole proprietor, would create a roadmap for 
fraud. In that situation, shareholders of professional corporations would have an 
incentive to abuse the corporate form by moving back and forth between a 
corporate entity and a sole proprietorship in order to avoid unwanted liabilities, and 
form would triumph over substance. 
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On the other hand, the Court could simply look through the form of the 
transaction at issue and decide that, in substance, Attorney Kelley’s sole 
proprietorship is a mere continuation of the predecessor corporation and, thus, he is 
liable for the judgment, just as a corporate successor would have been. Yet 
significant differences exist between successor corporate liability and successor 
individual liability.  
In successor corporation liability cases, a judgment against the successor 
corporation exposes stockholders to the loss of their investment in the successor 
corporation, but not to personal liability. Here, Mr. Smith seeks an in personam 
judgment against Attorney Kelley for the entire amount of Mr. Smith’s judgment 
against the PC, irrespective of the value of the PC’s assets transferred to Attorney 
Kelley. Such a judgment against Attorney Kelley could presumably be executed 
against any of his personal assets.  
Mr. Smith also broadly defines the successor enterprise as encompassing 
Attorney Kelley’s entire professional practice including, so far as appears, not only 
clients who had once been clients of the PC but also any clients he has taken on 
since then. It is relatively straightforward to require disbursement of particular 
property or assets that may have been obtained without paying full value. But 
encumbering revenues from future professional services to customers of a defunct 
professional corporation or new customers seeking professional services from a 
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former shareholder implicates additional concerns. Restriction of a right to practice 
any profession is potentially problematic.1 
Read as broadly as Mr. Smith seems to urge, any continuation of a 
professional’s career is arguably a continuation of the prior business, but Chapter 
156A makes it clear that professionals do not sacrifice their rights to practice 
individually by becoming stockholders of a professional corporation. Chapter 
156A, § 5 provides that nothing in this statute shall be construed “to prohibit the 
rendering of professional services by a licensed natural person acting in his 
individual capacity, notwithstanding that such person may be a shareholder, 
director, officer, employee or agent of a professional corporation . . . .” Section 5 
also makes it clear that the PC as an abstract legal entity may render services only 
through duly licensed individuals.   
Equity has traditionally been sensitive to the use of its remedies in 
connection with personal services contracts. Licensed professionals have statutory 
and constitutional rights to practice their professions, and the legislature carefully 
preserved those rights in the professional corporation statute. These are all factors 
to take into account in applying the equitable doctrine of successor liability, and 
may caution against an overly broad conclusion about the scope of what constitutes 
                                                 
1 Amici discuss in Argument II particular aspects of the legal profession. 
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the successor entity in cases involving licensed professionals performing personal 
services.  
II. Successor Liability Of Individual Lawyers Is Governed  
By Both Chapter 156A And SJC Rule 3:06, Which Must  
Be Construed In Light Of The Ethical Standards Governing  
The Practice Of Law, Particularly Those That Recognize  
A Client’s Right To Choose A Lawyer 
 
The Court has adopted additional rules with respect to the use of limited 
liability entities in the provision of legal services. Under Rule 3:06, attorneys may 
use limited liability entities to practice law, subject to certain limitations. See SJC 
Rule 3:06. First, every shareholder of a professional corporation is “liable for 
damages which arise out of the performance of legal services on behalf of the 
entity and which are caused by his or her own negligent or wrongful act, error, or 
omission.” SJC Rule 3:06 (3)(a); see also Grand Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Brauer, 57 
Mass. App. Ct. 407, 414 (2003). Attorney Kelley was found in the federal 
litigation not to have committed any personal wrongdoing. 
Second, with respect to liability arising from the professional corporation’s 
provision of legal services, shareholders who did not cause the negligent or 
wrongful act are nonetheless jointly and severally liable for damages resulting 
from “any negligent or wrongful act, error, or omission of any owner or employee 
of said entity which occurs in the performance of legal services by said entity and 
which results in damages to the person or persons for whom the services were 
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being performed,” to the extent such claims exceed the assets of the professional 
corporation, up to $500,000.2 See SJC Rule 3:06 (3)(b). Mr. Smith was not a client 
of Attorney Kelley or the PC. 
Attorney shareholders thus enjoy limited liability for regular business 
liabilities of the professional corporation, including contractual debts or torts. In 
addition, shareholders of professional corporations are liable for damages to clients 
(subject to a cap) arising from professional negligent or wrongful conduct 
performed in the name of the corporation. Shareholders remain exposed to 
unlimited liability for their own professional negligent or wrongful actions. 
Rule 3:06 clearly envisions that the professional corporation is not an 
absolute shield against shareholder liability and that shareholders shall remain 
subject to personal liability for at least some of the corporation’s liabilities. By 
reaching through the corporate shield and assigning at least some portion of 
liability derived from malpractice claims to attorney shareholders of professional 
corporations, the Court appropriately exercises its inherent power to regulate the 
practice of law. 
In the case before the Court, damages arise out of the performance of legal 
services, but the injured party was not a client of the professional corporation. 
                                                 
2 The liability cap for shareholders is equal to $50,000 plus $15,000 multiplied by 
the number of owners and employees of said entity who are licensed to practice 
law, capped at no more than $500,000 in the aggregate. SJC Rule 3:06(3)(b). 
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Arguably, Rule 3:06(3)(b) by its terms does not assign liability for these damages 
to the shareholder of the professional corporation. Although Rule 3:06(3)(b) may 
not assign liability to Attorney Kelley, the common law doctrines of piercing the 
corporate veil and successor liability remain available because the Rule does 
displace liability that might exist under Chapter 156A. 
Rule 3:06 permits shareholders of professional corporations to leave regular 
business liabilities behind while assigning at least some portion of the liabilities – 
those related to the wrongful or negligent conduct of the professional corporation’s 
shareholders and employees – with the professional corporation and its 
shareholders. By imposing personal liability on shareholders for liabilities 
associated with the wrongful conduct, the Court incentivizes attorneys operating 
through limited liability entities to engage in self-regulation of the type that was 
commonplace under traditional rules of partnership. In the exercise of its 
constitutional and supervisory powers over the practice of law, the Court may wish 
to limit the ability of lawyers operating under a professional corporation to escape 
liability for certain torts committed during the practice of law but not against a 
client.   
This does not, however, suggest that a solo practitioner of law should always 
be liable for the debts of a purported corporate predecessor. To do so could raise 
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the prospect that lawyers, having availed themselves of the benefits of limited 
liability entities in good faith, would never be free of corporate liabilities  
In resolving this case, the Court should be guided by a number of 
considerations. First, a lawyer’s ability to practice law in the Commonwealth is a 
privilege subject to regulation by the Court. See In re Application for Admission to 
the Bar, 444 Mass. 393, 397 (2005), quoting In re Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 101 
(1996) (“The right to practice law ‘is a peculiar privilege granted . . . to those who 
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character.’”). 
The harm that follows from a restriction on the ability to practice can be 
substantial. In re Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 341-342 (1997) (citing reputational harm 
and the loss of clients resulting from suspension of the right to practice). Having 
granted to a lawyer the privilege of admission to the bar, Massachusetts courts 
have consistently affirmed that restrictions on a lawyer’s ability to practice are 
void as against public policy when they unduly impinge on the freedom of clients 
to retain counsel of their choosing. See, e.g., Pierce v. Morrison Mahoney LLP, 
452 Mass. 718, 724 (2008) (affirming that SJC Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6 – 
preventing a lawyer from engaging in a partnership agreement that restricts an 
attorney’s ability to practice after leaving the partnership – protects clients rather 
than lawyers). Assigning successor liability to a lawyer-successor may contravene 
the strong public interest in allowing clients to retain counsel of their choice by 
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potentially causing lawyers to decline to represent clients of the predecessor 
corporation in order not to trigger potential successor liability obligations. But in 
the context of claims related to wrongful conduct toward clients, the Court has 
already assigned personal liability to lawyer-shareholders of professional 
corporations without regard to any potential adverse effects on the right of clients 
to retain counsel of their choice.  
Conclusion 
Equitable remedies used in determining the scope of shareholder liabilities 
under Chapter 156D are fully available for use in determining shareholder 
liabilities under Chapter 156A, but must be applied in light of the special equitable 
considerations involved in professional services licensed and regulated by the state. 
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Addendum 1: G. L. c. 156A, Section 6: Shareholder Liability; Professional 
Relationship; Privileged Communications 
(a)  Except as otherwise provided by law or regulation, the personal liability of a 
shareholder of a professional corporation organized under this chapter shall be no 
greater in any respect than that of a shareholder of a corporation organized under 
chapter 156D.  
(b)  This chapter shall not alter any law applicable to the relationship between a 
person rendering professional services and a person receiving such services, 
including liability arising out of such professional services.  
(c)  Any privilege applicable to communications between a person rendering 
professional services and the person receiving such services shall extend to 
communications between a professional corporation or its employees rendering 
professional services and the person receiving such services. 
 
G. L. c. 156A, Section 5: Rendition of professional services; construction of 
chapter  A professional corporation may render professional services in the 
commonwealth only through its officers, employees and agents who are duly 
licensed to render such professional services in the commonwealth; provided, 
however, that nothing in this chapter shall be construed (a) to require any person 
who is employed by a professional corporation to be licensed to perform services 
for which no license is otherwise required, (b) to prohibit the rendering of 
professional services by a licensed natural person acting in his individual capacity, 
notwithstanding that such person may be a shareholder, director, officer, employee 
or agent of a professional corporation, or (c) to prohibit unlicensed persons 
employed by a professional corporation from rendering professional services under 
the supervision of licensed officers, employees or agents of such professional 
corporation, to the extent permitted by law or the regulations of the applicable 
regulating board.  
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Addendum 2: Excerpt From Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 
3:06: Use Of Limited Liability Entities 
(1) As used in this rule, the term "entity" shall mean a professional corporation, a 
limited liability company, or a limited liability partnership organized to practice law 
pursuant to the laws of any state or other jurisdiction of the United States and which 
practices law in the Commonwealth. The provisions of such laws shall be applicable 
to attorneys practicing law in the Commonwealth subject to the terms and conditions 
of this rule. Such terms and conditions are necessary and appropriate for the purpose 
of making the provisions of those laws applicable to attorneys. As used in this rule, 
the term "owner" shall mean a shareholder of a professional corporation, a member 
of a limited liability company, or a partner of a limited liability partnership. 
. . .  
(3) The following provisions are established with respect to the liability of the 
owners of an entity with respect to damages which arise out of the performance of legal 
services by the entity, such provisions to be in addition to any statutory or common law 
rules of general application which deal with the liability of entities and their owners: 
(a)  Each owner of the entity shall be personally liable for damages which 
arise out of the performance of legal services on behalf of the entity and which 
are caused by his or her own negligent or wrongful act, error, or omission. 
Owners of the entity whose acts, errors, or omissions did not cause the damages 
shall not be personally liable therefor, whether or not they have agreed with any 
owners or employees or other persons to contribute to the payment of the 
liability, except to the extent provided in subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d). 
(b) All the owners of an entity which is a professional corporation at the 
time of any negligent or wrongful act, error, or omission of any owner or 
employee of said entity which occurs in the performance of legal services by 
said entity and which results in damages to the person or persons for whom 
the services were being performed shall be jointly and severally liable for such 
damages, but only to the extent of the excess, if any, of (1) the sum of $50,000 
plus the product of $15,000 multiplied by the number of owners and 
employees of said entity at the time of such act, error, or omission who are 
duly licensed by this court to practice law in the Commonwealth, or duly 
licensed to practice law by the licensing authority in the jurisdiction in which 
they practice, and who are owners of or employed by said entity as lawyers, 
but not in excess of $500,000 in the aggregate, over (2) the sum of the assets 
of said entity and the proceeds of any insurance policy issued to it which are 
applied to the payment of such damages. 
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